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TOO MANY COOKS IN THE KITCHEN: BATTLING
CORPORATE CORRUPTION IN BRAZIL AND
THE PROBLEMS WITH A DECENTRALIZED
ENFORCEMENT MODEL
Michelle A. Winters*
INTRODUCTION
In June of 2013, over one million Brazilians in one hundred
cities took to the streets in what have become the largest protests in
Brazil in two decades.1 Rallies began in early June when the Movimento Passe Livre (“MPL”), or Free Fare Movement, led a small demonstration demanding the reversal of a recent increase in public
transport fares in the city of São Paulo from R$3 to R$3.20.2 The MPL
returned in larger numbers in the following days, and the police responded with increased brutality: beating up demonstrators and bystanders alike, throwing tear gas into classrooms on university
campuses, and wounding several journalists.3
Over the next two weeks, the protests steadily gained supporters rallying over a number of decentralized issues including the need
for more public services; disgust over police brutality; anger over the
cost of the 2014 World Cup; gay rights; the legalization of drugs; the
end of compulsory voting; abortion rights; and most especially, corruption.4 It is telling that these protests coincided with final verdicts in
* J.D., cum laude, American University Washington College of Law, 2014; B.A.,
The Ohio State University, 2009. I would like to thank Professors Dante Figueroa
and André Paiva de Teixeira for their guidance throughout the writing process
and my family for their endless love and support. This Article is dedicated to the
incomparable people of Brazil who taught me the meaning of saudade.
1
Brazil Unrest: ‘Million’ Join Protests in 100 Cities, BBC NEWS (June 21, 2013,
12:17AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22992410.
2
See Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff ‘Proud’ of Protests, BBC NEWS (June 18,
2013, 8:15PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-22961874 (discussing the circumstances surrounding Brazil’s mass protests).
3
See generally Robert Mackey, Protests Expand in Brazil, Fueled by Video of Police Brutality, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2013), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/
06 / 18 / protests-expand-in-brazil-fueled-by-video-of-police-brutality / ?_r=0; More
than 50 Journalists Hurt in Brazil Protests, THE DAILY STAR (June 29, 2013), http:/
/www.dailystar.com.lb/News/International/2013/Jun-29/222002-more-than-50journalists-hurt-in-brazil-protests.ashx#axzz2nwwyIDfA (chronicling the violent
actions taken by Brazilian police during the mass protests).
4
See Gary Duffy, Brazil’s Leaders Caught Out by Mass Protests, BBC News (June
17, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-22947466 (listing the
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Brazil’s biggest political corruption trial in history, the Mensalâo (Big
Monthly Payment Scandal).5 Indeed, a large percentage of protestors
declared that they were focused on “ending the perceived impunity and
lack of accountability of political leaders.”6 Under fierce political pressure and facing historically low satisfaction ratings, in August of 2013,
Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff signed law number 12.846/2013,7
popularly referred to as the Clean Company Law (Lei da empresa
limpa) or Brazilian Anti-Corruption Act (“BACA”).8

wealth of causes that protestors cited as their reasons for attending nationwide
demonstrations).
5
See Anderson Antunes, The Cost of Corruption In Brazil Could Be Up To $53
Billion Just This Year Alone, FORBES (Nov. 28, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
andersonantunes/2013/11/28/the-cost-of-corruption-in-brazil-could-be-up-to-53billion-just-this-year-alone/ (reporting that Brazil’s Attorney General referred to
the Mensalão as “the most daring and outrageous corruption scheme and embezzlement of public funds ever seen in Brazil”).
6
See John Lyons, Matthew Cowley & Paulo Trevisani, Brazil Court Allows Corruption Case Appeals, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424127887323808204579083571863389380 (noting that the Brazilian Supreme Court’s decision to hear appeals for twelve Mensalão defendants
“could send shock waves through [the] country”). See also Brazil Unrest, supra
note 1 (discussing the rallying cry of many of the protestors).
7
Decreto No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]
de 02.08.2013 (Braz.) [hereinafter Lei Anti-Corrupção].
8
Accord Senra Gabriel Pereira da Cunha, Lei Anticorrupção é Resposta aos
Protestos, CUNHAPEREIRA.ADV.BR (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.cunhapereira.adv.br/
noticias/lei-anticorrupcao-resposta-protestos/ (arguing that the passage of Brazil’s
new anti-corruption was a direct result of the protests in the summer of 2013). In
fact, as a result of the public’s disgust, other anti-corruption measures are being
debated by the national legislature. The Senate recently approved the Draft Law
5.900/13, which makes corruption a heinous crime, and increased the minimum
prison sentence from two to four years for persons guilty of this crime, in addition
to adding travel restrictions that could seriously affect the ability of executives
and companies to conduct their operations when facing trial for such crimes. The
legislation, which still needs to be approved by the House of Representatives,
would apply to public officials who taken advantage of their position to obtain benefits or divert public resources. See A Lei Anticorrupçâo Empresarial Brasileira –
Novos Riscos para Empresas que Operam no Brasil, JONESDAY.COM, http://www
.jonesday.com/pt/a-lei-anticorrupcao-empresarial-brasileira—novos-riscos-paraempresas-que-operam-no-brasil-08-16-2013/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Novos Riscos].
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I. A CULTURE OF CORRUPTION? THE MENSALÂO SCANDAL AND
BRAZIL’S DECISION TO BECOME “TOUGH” ON CORRUPTION
Some have argued that corruption in Brazil is actually a product of Brazilian culture.9 Jeitinho brasileiro is a frequently used expression that refers to circumventing rules and social conventions
using emotional resources, blackmail, family ties, promises, rewards,
or money to obtain favors or to get an advantage.10 While jeitinho brasileiro typically manifests “innocently enough” in small transactions
like cash payments to police officers in order to avoid speeding tickets,
it can also manifest on a larger scale as corporate or political
corruption.
A. Corruption by the Numbers
Brazil has long been party to the United Nations Convention
against Corruption, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (“OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention”), and the Inter-American Convention against Corruption.11 Yet, most observers would say that the country has to this point
inadequately tackled bribery in international business because of a
lack of enforcement.12 Although the country ratified the OECD AntiBribery Convention, in the twelve years following ratification, officials
have pursued only one case and two investigations.13 The true reality
of corruption in Brazil is much more problematic than those three isolated cases. From 2003 to 2012, the federal auditor’s office fired nearly
4000 employees from public service; most firings stemmed from allega9

E.g., Lucas Gabriel Marins, Jeitinho Brasileiro Facilita Corrupçâo Dizem Especialistas, GAZETA DO POVO (June 11, 2013), http://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/
economia/conteudo.phtml?id=1423013&tit=Jeitinho-brasileiro-facilita-corrupcaodizem-especialistas [hereinafter Jeitinho brasileiro facilita] (arguing that corruption is the result of a cultural phenomenon); Mark Vasconcellos, Lei Anticorrupção
Pode Frear Rerceirização no Brasil, CONSULTOR JURÍDICO (Feb. 7, 2014, 3:35PM),
http://www.conjur.com.br/2014-fev-07/leianticorrupcao-frear-terceirizacao-areaslidam-governo (noting that the culture of jeitinho brasileiro is hard to change).
10
STEPHANIE DENNISON & LISA SHAW, POPULAR CINEMA IN BRAZIL: 1930-2001, at
21–23 (2004); Robert M. Levine, Jeitinho Land, in BRAZILIAN LEGACIES 212,
212–14 (1997).
11
See United Nations Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification
Status as of 2 April 2014, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, https://
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last visited July 26,
2014); Brazil – OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/daf/
anti-bribery/brazil-oecdanti-briberyconvention.htm (last visited July, 26, 2014).
12
Corruption by Country: Brazil, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, http://www
.transparency.org/country#BRA (last visited Dec. 21, 2013).
13
Id.
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tions of corruption or dishonesty.14 According to a local media outlet,
between 2008 and 2012, the number of individuals convicted for active
and passive corruption increased by 133%.15 In 2013 alone, the federal
police conducted 172 special operations to combat corruption, resulting
in the arrests of 940 individuals.16 The monetary consequences of corruption are staggering: a March 2010 study conducted by the Federation of Industries of São Paulo found that each year Brazil loses 1.38%
to 2.3% of its GDP (between $26 billion and $43 billion) to corruption.17 This study, however, does not consider the monies lost as a result of the decline in the country’s ability to attract foreign
investments.18
B. The Mensalão Scandal and Political Corruption in Brazil
Over the last six years, the Mensalâo Scandal is the most representative example of corruption in Brazil.19 “Mensalâo” refers to
clandestine payments made by the Workers’ Party (Partido
Trabalhador (“PT”)) to congressional allies in exchange for votes supporting its legislative agenda.20 Originally discovered in 2005, “[t]he
14

Id.
Stella Dawson, Brazil’s Corporate Bribery Law is a Step Forward but Faces
Tough Scrutiny – OECD Official, THOMSON REUTERS FOUNDATION (Nov. 22, 2013,
10:28PM), http://www.trust.org/item/20131122222839-uqg1w/.
16
Carlos Ayres, How Brazil is Fighting Corruption, FCPAMÉRICAS (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://fcpamericas.com/english/anti-money-laundering/brazil-fighting-corruption/
#sthash.1R2WWu0G.dpuf.
17
Frederick T. Stocker, Anti-Corruption Compliance in Brazil—Addressing a
Daunting Challenge, MFRS ALLIANCE FOR PRODUCTIVITY AND INNOVATION 3 (March
2012), https://www.mapi.net/system/files/PA106_1.pdf. Brazil currently occupies
69th place in the corruption rankings by the Transparency & Anti-Corruption Initiatives of the United Nations. The organization estimates that corruption costs
Brazil about R$85 billion each year. See Jeitinho brasileiro facilita, supra note 9.
18
See generally Sidney Vianna, Anti-corruption and Doing Business in Brazil,
ETHIC INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 10, 2012), http://ethic-intelligence.com/experts/89-brazil
-anti-corruption-trends (arguing that corruption negatively impacts Brazil’s ability to attract foreign investments); Jeitinho brasileiro facilita, supra note 9 (arguing that to attract foreign investors and make the country more competitive,
Brazil and specifically its corporations must show that they are honest).
19
See Antenor Madruga & Ana Maria Belotto, Anti-Corruption Enforcement and
Policies in Brazil: Changing Times Bring a Host of Development, 4 DEBEVOISE &
PLIMPTON FCPA UPDATE, no. 8, Mar. 2013, at 11, 13 (calling the ruling in the
Mensalão case “the most emblematic law enforcement event in current Brazilian
history”).
20
See O que foi o mensalão?, MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO FEDERAL (Aug. 9, 2012), http://
www.turminha.mpf.mp.br/honestidade/corrupcao/mensalao/entenda-o-caso/o-quefoi-o-mensalao (describing the scandal in a more simplified manner to educate
Brazilian youths).
15
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scandal was one of many that broke in quick succession, with others
involving allegations that the state-run postal system accepted bribes
for contracts and that the PT had been extorting money from illegalbetting rings in Rio de Janeiro.”21 The biggest name among the accused was José Dirceu, Chief of Staff under then-president Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva until he was forced to step down because of the
scandal.22 Mensaleiros, as they are called, have been found guilty of
crimes including bribery, money laundering, misuse of public funds,
and conspiracy.23
C. Corruption in the Private Sector
The presence of a wide range of regulatory agencies in Brazil
ties corporate and political corruption together and can increase the
likelihood that public officials will demand bribes.24 Public procurement, and the bidding process associated with it, is one of the most
commonly recognized arenas for corruption.25 Nevertheless, Brazil’s
extremely complex tax system is also prone to corruption.26 Allegedly,
tax authorities frequently request bribes “to relax assessments and inspections, to refrain from pursuing instances of alleged fraud, and for
giving tax obligation reduction advice.”27 The problem is so pervasive
that Transparência Brasil reported in a 2003 study that more than
half of Brazilian businesses received requests for bribes from tax authorities.28 According to a 2009 survey, almost 70% of Brazilian business owners and top managers identify corruption as a major
constraint in the corporate sector.29
21

H.J.,What is Brazil’s “mensalão”?, ECONOMIST (Nov. 18, 2013, 11:50 PM), http://
www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/11/economist-explains-14. See
generally Petição (Federal Complaint), Ação Penal Nº 470-DF, available at http://
www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/noticiaNoticiaStf/anexo/AP_470_Peticao_n_382072011
.pdf [hereinafter Federal Complaint] (enumerating each of the defendants and the
charges against them).
22
See Madruga & Belotto, supra note 19, at 11.
23
See Federal Complaint, supra note 21, at 2. See generally id.; Quadro de Reus
(Table of Charges), MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO FEDERAL, available at http://www
.turminha.mpf.mp.br/quadro_de_reus.pdf (containing the federal charges against
each individual Mensaleiro).
24
Corruption by Country: Brazil, supra note 13.
25
See Stocker, supra note 17, at 3 (discussing the most corrupt sectors of Brazilian business).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Brazil Data—World Bank Enterprise Survey of Business Managers, WORLD
BANK GROUP, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Data/ExploreEconomies/2009/
brazil, (last visited July 28, 2014).
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Previously, Brazilian anti-corruption laws imposed liability on
individuals regardless of whether they acted on behalf of, or were induced by, corporations.30 Corporations, however, faced no such criminal or civil liability.31 The measures in place were often seen as
ineffective.32
D. A Look at the Substantive Standards Behind BACA and
Combating Corruption in Brazil
BACA took effect on January 29, 2014, 180 days after its publication in the Federal Official Gazette of Brazil (Diário Oficial da
União).33 The Act, drawing from foreign legislation like the United
States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) and the United Kingdom’s Anti-Bribery Act, will bring important and immediate consequences for businesses operating in Brazil.34 The Act imposes civil and
administrative liability for Brazilian companies for acts of domestic
and international corruption.35 Foreign corporations that operate in
Brazil can also be held liable for acts of corruption committed in Brazil.36 This new concept of corporate liability builds on the existing
30

See Stocker, supra note 17, at 10 (stating that unlike common law jurisdictions,
civil law systems generally do not apply criminal liability to legal as opposed to
natural persons).
31
See id.
32
See Stocker, supra note 17, at 10, 11.
33
Agência Brasil, Lei Anticorrupção Empresarial entra em Vigor sem Decreto de
Regulamentação, CORREIO BRAZILENSE (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.correio
braziliense.com.br/app/noticia/politica/2014/01/29/interna_politica,410224/lei-anti
corrupcao-empresarial-entra-em-vigor-sem-decreto-de-regulamentacao.shtml.
34
See generally Marcelo Figueiredo, Impressões Preliminaries sobre a Lei Anticorrupção, GGN (Dec. 11, 2013), http://jornalggn.com.br/noticia/impressoes-preliminares-sobre-a-lei-anticorrupcao (giving initial impressions regarding the AntiCorruption Act).
35
Decreto No. 12,846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, Código Civil [C.C.] (Brazilian Civil
Code) de 02.08.2013 art. 2 [hereinafter Decreto No. 12,846] (“A corporate personhood shall be strictly liable, in the civil and administrative sectors, for harmful
acts specified in this Act.”); see also André Marques Gilberto, Brazil’s Anti-corruption “Clean Company Law” goes into Effect 1/24/14—Get Ready to Comply,
DLAPIPER.COM (Aug. 12,2013), http://www.dlapiper.com/brazil-anti-corruptionclean-company-law-goes-into-effect-1-24-14-get-ready-to-comply/ (describing the
applicability of the Anti-Corruption Law).
36
Decreto No. 12,846 art. 1 (Braz.) (“The provisions of this Act apply to . . . foreign
corporations that have their headquarters, a branch office, or representation in
Brazilian territory, . . . even temporarily.”); see also Felipe Berer et al., Brazilian
FCPA-Equivalent Signed Into Law, AKERMAN (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.akerman
.com/documents/res.asp?id=1745 (discussing the widespread applicability of the
Anti-Corruption Act).

2015]

TOO MANY COOKS IN THE KITCHEN

687

criminal liability of individuals who bribe foreign and domestic public
officials.37
Prohibited acts: Article 5 of the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Act
prohibits (i) promising, offering, or giving, directly or indirectly, an undue advantage to a public official or third person related to him or her;
(ii) financing, funding, sponsoring, or in any way subsidizing the practice of illicit acts under the law; (iii) using an intermediary legal entity
or individuals to conceal or disguise its real interests or the identity of
the beneficiaries of the wrongdoings; and (iv) hindering the investigation or audit of a government agency, a public entity, or its agents.38
The Act, however, covers more than just corruption. Significant parts
of BACA’s prohibited acts address illegal conduct related to public tenders and public contracting.39 The prohibited conduct is deliberately
broad and includes not only the “actual payment or provision of any
undue advantage to any public official or third party, but also the acts
of offering, promising, sponsoring, or otherwise supporting such
activity.”40
Strict liability: Article 2 of the Act, in contrast with its U.S.
equivalent, the FCPA, holds companies strictly liable for prohibited activities, meaning that the government need not show any intent on the
part of the corporate actor.41 Prosecutors need only prove that an illegal act occurred and that it benefited the company.42
Sanctions: The sanctions set forth in the Anti-Corruption Act
include administrative sanctions (which a public administration can
apply directly) and judicial sanctions (which judges apply).43 Article 6
37

Decreto No. 12,846 art. 3 § 1-2 (Braz.) (“Corporate liability does not preclude
individual liability of the corporation’s directors or officers or any natural person,
accessory, or participant in the illegal activity.”); see also Novos Riscos, supra note
8 (discussing that corporate liability is in addition to the existing criminal liability
of individuals who bribe foreign public officials and Brazilian).
38
Decreto No. 12,846 art. 5 (I)-(IV) (Braz.); see also Jonathan R. Barr, et al., The
FCPA on Steroids: Brazil Ups the Ante in Fighting Corporate Corruption,
BAKERLAW.COM (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.bakerlaw.com/alerts/the-fcpa-on-ster
oids-brazil-ups-the-ante-in-fighting-corporate-corruption-8-12-2013/ (enumerating
the prohibited acts under the Anti-Corruption Act).
39
See generally Decreto No. 12,846 art. 5 (IV)(a)-(g) (Braz.).
40
Marcelo dos Santos Barradas Correia et al., A Comparison of the New Brazilian
Anticorruption Law, the FCPA, and the UK Bribery Act, ASS’N OF CORPORATE
COUNSEL, http://www.acc.com/legalresources/quickcounsel/cnbalfuba.cfm (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
41
Decreto No. 12,846 art. 2 (Braz.); see also Barr, supra note 38 (comparing the
text of the Anti-Corruption Act with its FCPA counterpart).
42
See Gilberto, supra note 35 (discussing the strict liability nature of the Act).
43
See Decreto No. 12,846 arts. 6 & 19 (Braz.) (outlining the administrative and
judicial sanctions contemplated under the Act).
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of the Act outlines the administrative sanctions which are: a) fines in
the amounts of 0.1% to 20% of the gross revenue of the legal entity;
and b) publication of the condemnatory decision.44 Judicial sanctions
under Article 19 include: a) loss of assets, rights, or valuables directly
or indirectly related to the wrongdoing; b) partial suspension or interdiction of activities; c) compulsory dissolution of the legal entity;
and d) prohibition from receipt of incentives and public funding.45 In
all cases, the legal entities also have to pay reparations for damages
caused.46
Leniency agreements: In spite of its stiff penalties, Chapter 5 of
BACA rewards self-disclosure and full cooperation with government
investigations and proceedings. An agency may allow a company to
enter into a leniency agreement, which may confer the following benefits: (i) up to a two-thirds reduction in fines; (ii) a waiver of debarment;
and (iii) avoidance of government publication of its decision regarding
the conduct.47 Regardless of the conditions of the leniency agreement
established by the governing agency, companies must provide full restitution for damages caused.48
Enforcement: As discussed above, the law provides for civil and
administrative penalties.49 The Act specifically charges several governmental agencies, i.e. the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica), the Ministry of
44

Decreto No. 12,846 art. 6(I)-(II) (Braz.); see also Carlos Ayres, How Brazil’s New
Anti-Bribery Law Compares to the FCPA—Part 1, FCPAMÉRICAS (Aug. 6, 2013),
http://fcpamericas.com/english/brazil/how-brazils-new-anti-bribery-law-comparesto-the-fcpa-part-1/#sthash.9NiNcniO.dpuf.
45
See Decreto No. 12,846 art. 19 (Braz.).
46
See id. art. 6 § 3o. President Rousseff vetoed some of the more favorable provisions approved by the Brazilian Congress, according to which: (i) administrative
penalties would be limited to the total value of the contract object of the corruption
offense; (ii) some sanctions were conditioned to proof of corrupt intention; (iii) the
active participation of the public official to the act could serve as mitigating factor.
See Rita Motta & Steven M. Bauer, Brazilian Anti-Corruption Law: 7 Implications
and Challenges for Companies Doing Business in Brazil, LATHAM & WATKINS CLIENT ALERT COMMENTARY, Jan. 6, 2014 No. 1629, at 3 n.7; Andy Spalding, Brazil’s
President Dilma Takes a Stand, FCPA BLOG (Aug. 4, 2013, 8:32 PM), http://www
.fcpablog.com/blog/2013/8/4/brazils-president-dilma-takes-a-stand.html.
47
Decreto No. 12,846 art. 16 (Braz.); see Barr, supra note 38 (describing possible
sanctions imposed on companies found in violation of the Act).
48
Decreto No. 12,846 art. 16 § 3 (Braz.) (“The leniency agreement does not exempt
the corporate entity from its obligation to make full reparation for the damage
caused.”); see also Matteson Ellis, The Problem with Leniency Agreements in Brazil, FCPÁMERICAS (Jan. 7, 2014), http://fcpamericas.com/english/brazil/problemleniency-agreements-brazil/ (discussing the fundamentals of leniency agreements
under BACA).
49
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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Justice (Ministério da Justiça), and the Ministry of Finance (Ministério da Fazenda), with the power to prosecute violations and impose
applicable administrative sanctions.50 Additionally, the highest authorities in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches at the federal, state, and municipal levels may initiate the investigation or
prosecution of alleged violators at the agencies’ discretion or based on
petitions filed with the government.51 These agencies will be authorized to grant clemency or give reductions of any penalties.52 The sheer
number of agencies and government entities who may prosecute corporations will undoubtedly make for inconsistent applications of law,
real challenges to cooperation between the agencies, and a lack of oversight, which might lead to further corruption. For now, the Act does
not provide substantive standards for these bodies to comply with its
regulations. This article explores the problems associated with Brazil’s
diffuse enforcement model and recommends both legislative and administrative changes that will improve efficiency and effectiveness.
II.

DECENTRALIZED ENFORCEMENT: THE PRIMARY FAILURE

OF

BACA

As previously mentioned, one of the most problematic elements
of the highly touted Brazilian Anti-Corruption Act is its delegation to
essentially any entity of Brazil’s public administration (at the federal,
state, and municipal levels) of the power to investigate possible illegal
acts.53 While the Act specifically states that the Comptroller General
(Controladoria-Geral da União (“CGU”)) will investigate matters involving the executive federal power for acts committed against the
Brazilian public administration, enforcement of BACA will be up to
the highest authority of the executive, legislative, or judicial body affected by the conduct, and the Public Prosecutor’s Office in cases of
civil liability.54 This means that hundreds of federal government agencies, including the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable
50

See Decreto No. 12,846 art. 29 (Braz.).
See id. art. 8 (“The initiation of administrative proceedings and prosecution of
corporate entities for determination of liability rest with the head of each agency
or entity of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branch.”).
52
See Juan Carlos Varela et al., Brazil: Brazil’s New Anti-Corruption Law: What
Every Multinational Employer Should Know, MONDAQ (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www
.mondaq.com/x/260016/White+Collar+Crime+Fraud/Brazils+New+AntiCorrup
tion+Law+What+Every+Multinational+Employer+Should+Know.
53
Accord Marques Gilberto, supra note 35 (calling the Act’s delegation of powers
to essentially any entity of Brazil’s public administration a pressing concern).
54
See Decreto No. 12,846 arts. 8 & 19 (Braz.); see also Carlos Ayres, An Extraordinary Number of Enforcement Authorities Under Brazil’s New Anti-Bribery Law . . .
and the Potential Negative Consequences, FCPÁMERICAS (Jan. 10, 2014) (“Brazil
has approximately 5,700 municipalities, many of which have very few people and
limited resources. As a result, under the new law an extraordinary number of au51
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Natural Resources (“IBAMA”), the National Health Surveillance
Agency (“ANVISA”), the National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas,
and Biofuels (“ANP”), and many others, may seek accountability of
companies for acts including “not only bribery, but also fraud in public
procurement settings, bid rigging, and other acts committed against
public administrations” under the Act.55 What’s more, enforcement of
the BACA will be decentralized at the state or local level for those matters not involving a foreign public official or federal agency.56 Legislators believed the diffuse enforcement model would, in practice, lead to
swift punishment for violators.57
The diffuse enforcement model is consistent with previous Brazilian anti-corruption measures; however it stands in sharp contrast
with both U.S. enforcement of the FCPA and with U.K. enforcement of
the Anti-Bribery Act.58 In the United States, enforcement authority is
delegated solely to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Department of Justice.59 These two agencies work closely together
and, for the most part, “have developed a uniform and consistent approach to the enforcement of the FCPA.”60 In the United Kingdom, the
Serious Fraud Office is the law enforcement authority primarily rethorities – at the federal, state, and municipal levels – can investigate wrongdoing
and apply administrative sanctions for the acts prohibited by the new law.”).
55
Ayres, supra note 54; see Novos Riscos, supra note 8.
56
See Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, The Brazilian Anti-Corruption
Act of 2013 (Act #12846), MONDAQ (Feb. 16, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/x/
292696/international+trade+investment/The+Brazillian+AntiCorruption+Act+of+
2013+Act+12846.
57
Luı́sa Melo, Lei Anticorrupção Já Vale; Muitas Podem Ser Milionárias, EXAME
(Jan. 29, 2014), http://exame.abril.com.br/negocios/noticias/a-lei-anticorrupcaoesta-em-vigor-sua-empresa-se-preparou (according to Sérgio Seabra, Secretary of
Transparency and Prevention of Corruption at CGU).
58
Simeon M. Kriesberg & Bruno Werneck, Anti-Corruption Compliance in Brazil:
The Challenges Facing US Companies, MAYER BROWN LLP (Dec. 8, 2010), p. 23,
http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Event/ba843f1f-ad08-4caa-b364-e4be30ef2f18/
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sponsible for investigating and prosecuting cases relating to corruption under the Anti-Bribery Act.61
This article seeks to identify and address many of the potential
pitfalls of the diffuse enforcement model.
A. Lack of Uniformity in the Application and Interpretation of
BACA
Unfortunately, the interpretation and application of the law
will occur unpredictably and inconsistently, as each administrative
agency will follow different procedures and will be subject to the influence of different public policies.62 This is a major problem because certain aspects of the law (e.g., credit for compliance programs, leniency
programs in bribery cases) are new in Brazil, and agencies have no
guidelines to follow for instituting these procedures.63
One specific problem is the possibility of contrasting regulations in administrative actions (adjudicated before the judiciary) versus civil actions (adjudicated before the affected administrative
agency) brought under BACA.64 Another is that different municipalities may apply the law to similar facts in different ways.65 “With so
many different enforcement authorities interpreting the law and making independent decisions, incoherent outcomes and bad precedents
could develop.”66 This would result in a greater level of uncertainty for
companies.67
Corruption cases are complex.68 Without these doctrines in
place and often without proper technical knowledge or resources, indi61

See id.
See Ayres, supra note 54 (“Authorities in localities with little-to-no experience
in dealing with matters addressed in the new law will be able to bring cases
against any company doing business within their jurisdictions. This lack of specialized expertise could have negative consequences, especially with respect to the
proper application of the penalties (i.e., fines of up 20% of a company’s gross earnings in the previous fiscal year and publication of the condemnatory decision) and
the nuanced evaluation of compliance programs.”); Katna Baran, Órgâos Públicos
de Controle Discutem Efectividade da lei Anticorrupçâo, GAZETA DO POVO (Oct. 17,
2013 4:28PM), http://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/vidapublica/conteudo.phtml?id=
1417736 (citing the juxtaposition of the standards for administrative proceedings
and civil proceedings as a potential problem).
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See Ayres, supra note 54.
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Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Because of the complexity of corruption, the OECD specifically requires that
“complaints of bribery of foreign public officials . . . be seriously investigated by
competent authorities,” and “governments of parties to the Convention should pro62
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viduals will have the power to make decisions regarding the culpability of a corporation, and they could potentially “inflict irreparable
harm to the image of [an innocent] company.”69 Even with a standard
set of guidelines, there is concern that the small municipalities in particular may have difficulty applying this sophisticated law.70
Recognizing the potential danger of multiple interpretations of
BACA, Jorge Hage, the current Inspector General of the CGU, held a
meeting with several Brazilian law firms and corporations to discuss
ways to remedy the Act’s shortcomings.71 CGU will release draft legislation that gives guidance to regulatory agencies bringing charges
against corporations.72 Nonetheless, many Brazilian firms and corporations expressed concern about the scope of CGU’s regulatory decree,
particularly whether it would apply to state, municipal, and other
branches of government in addition to federal agencies.73 Although the
decree will apply universally, each state and county can make its own
rules, as the decree is only intended to create parameters for understanding BACA.74 Accordingly, the risk for inconsistent applications
vide adequate resources to allow effective prosecution of such bribery.” Sonia
Zaheer, Brazil’s Landmark Clean Companies Act: Comparison to The OECD AntiBribery Conventions and Issues, PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 44 (unpublished comment), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2417155 (citing OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions Official Commentaries 27, Dec. 17,
1997, 37 I.L.M. 1).
69
Senra Pereira da Cunha, supra note 8.
70
E.g., Nova lei Brasileira Anticorrupção traz Temor de Abusos, ASMETRO-SN
(Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.asmetro.org.br/portal/21-clipping/2696-nova-leibrasileira-anticorrupcao-traz-temor-de-abusos (citing small Brazilian municipalities that have little infrastructure as a threat because they may begin to see the
Act as a source of revenue); cf. J.P., Brazil’s New Anti-corruption Law: Hard to
Read, ECONOMIST (Jan. 29, 2014 9:40PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/
schumpeter/2014/01/brazils-new-anti-corruption-law [hereinafter Hard to Read]
(doubting the effectiveness of a set of federal guidelines because the country’s 27
states and 5,570 municipalities have the right to interpret the law as they see fit).
71
CGU, in English, the Office of the Inspector General of the Union, is an agency
of the executive branch, responsible for internal control and corrective systems, as
well as for overseeing the federal ombudsman.
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See Reunião no Instituto Ethos Debate Regulamentaçâo da lei Anticorrupçâo
Empresarial, JOGOS LIMPOS, http://www.jogoslimpos.org.br/destaques/reuniao-instituto-ethos-debate-regulamentacao-da-lei-anticorrupcao-empresarial/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Reunião no Instituto Ethos).
73
Id.
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Id.; accord Ayres, supra note 54 (“[T]here are already regulatory developments
at the state level – the State of Tocantins has issued regulations and the State of
São Paulo is also working on regulations to minimize the side effects of the decentralized approach.”).
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and interpretations remains because state and local governments will
maintain some flexibility to make rules and regulations.75
B. Lack of Efficiency
A lack of uniformity is not the only problem with BACA’s decentralized enforcement model. With so many agencies potentially
seeking sanctions against the same corrupt corporations for a single
transaction, there is great potential for inefficiency.
1. Coordination Poses a Challenge
Properly and effectively enforcing BACA will require substantial cooperation between government agencies.76 For example, the
Federal Prosecutor’s Office (Ministério Público) and Courts of Auditors
(Tribunais de Contas) must work together to jointly prosecute actions
for civil liability.77 Such cooperation poses a serious challenge, however. Potentially hundreds of agencies across the federal, state, and
local level may need to coordinate their efforts to prosecute corrupt
corporations. Without a network of trained staff and technological support, which are not currently in place due to the novelty of these anticorruption measures, such cooperation could be impossible, and enforcement would be slow.78
Nonetheless, integration between the various regulatory agencies is feasible.79 The Control Network of Public Management (Rede de
Controle da Gestão Públicas (“RCGP”)), founded in 2009, is increasing
the amount of public data that may be shared, thereby promoting the
75

But see Alex Rodrigues, Lei Anticorrupção Empresarial Entra em Vigor, Mas
Falta Regulamentação, AGÊNCIA BRASIL – EBC (Jan. 29, 2014 11:53AM), http://
agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/geral/noticia/2014-01/lei-anticorrupcao-empresarial-entra-em-vigor-mas-falta-regulamentacao (stating that many state and local governments are eagerly awaiting the CGU’s regulations as they will form the basis for
local regulations, and arguing that all governmental agencies are interested in
harmonious enforcement in order to avoid confusion and legal uncertainty).
76
See Reunião no Instituto Ethos, supra note 72.
77
See Baran, supra note 62; see also Jorge Hage, The Brazilian Experience in
Fighting Corruption, CGU, (Oct. 2013), https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q
=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&ved=0CDMQFjAD&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww
.canninghouse.org%2Fmedia-centre%2Fdocuments%3Fdownload%3D19%3Abraz
il-s-comptroller-general-minister-jorge-hage-on-brazil-s-experience-tackling-cor
ruption-part-1&ei= (listing more than ten agencies with anticorruption mandates
that may potentially need to partner with the CGU for effective enforcement).
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See Carlos Henrique Abrâo, Lei Anticorrupçâo Empresarial, BRASIL247 (Nov.
11, 2013), http://www.brasil247.com/pt/247/artigos/120430/Lei-anticorrup%C3%A
7%C3%A3o-empresarial.htm (describing the technological challenges surrounding
the decentralized enforcement approach).
79
See Baran, supra note 62.
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integration of intelligence agencies and training employees between
the various institutions.80
2. Stepping on Toes
Another issue with BACA is that the law fails to instruct agencies regarding how to proceed in the event that a corrupt transaction
affects multiple branches of government, more than one level of government, or officials from different agencies, as the law provides several authorities in Brazil with jurisdiction to enforce its provisions.81
This creates many unanswered questions. For example, if a corporation attempts to bribe government officials at the state and federal
level in a single transaction, who is responsible for seeking administrative remedies? If both the state and federal executive branches were
affected, it would seem that both could initiate administrative proceedings against the responsible corporation. There is no clear authority
that can proceed with a single prosecution against the corrupt
corporation.
Alternatively, what happens if a corporation attempts to bribe
officials in two different federal agencies? BACA gives the CGU concurrent power to conduct administrative proceedings for corruption involving the federal executive power.82 This seems to mean that, in the
event that two federal agencies are affected, both agencies have jurisdiction and CGU could intervene at any time. This might further contribute to inefficiency if CGU takes over proceedings while the other
agencies have already invested time and manpower investigating the
improper behavior.
BACA also gives the “highest authority of each public body or
entity” the ability to enter into leniency agreements.83 This raises various questions related to bribery violations that touch multiple jurisdictions. For instance, will companies have to enter into different
leniency agreements with agencies in the state of São Paulo and the
state of Rio de Janeiro?84 Moreover, it is unclear whether a company
that settles with the Office of the Federal Comptroller General can
force other entities to honor the settlement.85

80

Id.
See generally Ellis, supra note 48 (discussing the multiple authorities assigned
with prosecuting under BACA).
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See Decreto No. 12,846 art. 8 § 2 (Braz.).
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C. Conflicts of Interest and the Potential for Greater Corruption
A final source of potential controversy is the fact that the highest authority within each public body will preside over the proceedings
concerning alleged corrupt conduct inside said body.86 Politicians or
commissioned officers normally occupy these posts.87 Remember that
for an administrative investigation, the affected agency will bring
charges against the corporation allegedly in violation of BACA, and
then the Chief Minister or President of that agency will adjudicate and
make a final decision based on those allegations.88 This could give rise
to conflicts of interest and lead to situations of abuse, arbitrariness,
and even more corruption.89 Companies have voiced a number of specific situations where government agencies could abuse their newfound power.
In some smaller agencies, entities, or municipalities, the highest authority may have played a role in or had knowledge of the alleged illegal action or transaction under investigation.90 Moreover,
enforcement authorities could have professional or personal relationships with implicated individuals within their agency.91 This sharply
increases the likelihood that corruption will not come to light because
an agency has no incentive to “snitch” on itself. An agency head and
her employees do, however, have incentive to conceal their involvement in alleged illegal conduct and to avoid further scandal.92
In the alternative, the administrative process can be used to
either punish or protect companies. Article 24 of BACA provides that
the “fine and the loss of assets, rights or valuables applied” under the
new law will be “allocated preferably to the public bodies or entities
damaged.”93 Local businesses and legal communities are worried that
this feature may spur local agencies or entities (which often have
budget constraints) to bring frivolous enforcement actions against
companies in efforts to collect huge fines that could be allocated to
their public coffers. Or, even more perverse, some agencies may use
86

See supra note 49, and accompanying text.
Elton Bezerra, Advogados Alertam para Efeito Inverso de lei Anticorrupção,
CONJUR (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.conjur.com.br/2013-nov-19/especialistas-alert
am-risco-lei-anticorrupcao-efeito-inverso.
88
Para Especialista, Empresa é a Maior Interessada em Seguir a lei Anticorrupção, MIGALHAS (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.migalhas.com.br/Quentes/17,MI185896
,21048Para+especialista+empresa+e+a+maior+interessada+em§eguir+a+lei.
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Dos Santos Barradas Correia, supra note 39 (stating that the diffuse enforcement contemplated in the Act could give rise to conflicts of interest).
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Ayres, supra note 54.
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Bezerra, supra note 87 (discussing possible illegal activities in municipal
governments).
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See Ayres, supra note 54.
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the law for further extortion or corruption by selectively applying the
anti-corruption law to those organizations that do not pay bribes.94
The most cited example centers on corrupt mayors who have an
interest in harming construction companies to drive down bidding
prices.95 Specifically, government agents may blackmail businesses
bidding in municipal tenders to pay backhanders.96 The corporations
must either pay the bribes or risk subjection to protracted legal proceedings.97 If state and municipal governments do not follow clear federal guidance provided by CGU in how they implement the law, the
result could be more corruption, not less.98 The municipal level is further susceptible to this kind of corruption because the Act allows public officials and its agents to impose heavy fines depending on the
current local political climate.99 What this means is that a mayor up
for re-election may become “tough on corruption” just long enough to
regain his seat.100
BACA increases the risk for any company relying on the government for funding or relying on the government as a major client.101
Yet, in an instance of impropriety, such as extortion by a government
official, the affected corporation or business entity has no legal recourse. The decision of the administrative authority need not be supported by the opinion of a jury, and the legal standard for liability is
remarkably low.102 Furthermore, there is no chance of appeal.103
These problems are not exclusive to the administrative process
established by BACA. On the civil liability side, driven by the Public
Prosecutor, similar problems may exist. Under Brazilian law, the
94

See Siemens vê Risco de Abuso em lei Brasileira Anticorrupção, EXAME (Jan. 1,
2014) http://exame.abril.com.br/brasil/noticias/siemens-ve-risco-de-abuso-em-leibrasileira-anticorrupcao [hereinafter Siemens vê riscos].
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See id.; see also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
103
See Bezerra, supra note 87. But see Ayres, supra note 54 (“In the case of bribery of local officials at the Federal Executive branch level, the CGU has concurrent
authority to initiate administrative proceedings against legal entities and to examine and correct proceedings handled by other authorities. While this may serve
to minimize the negative impact of the decentralized approach at the Federal
level, it may not be sufficient. The CGU is not expected (and probably would not
have the resources) to intervene in all cases.”).
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Prosecutor’s Office is a functionally independent agency (or fourth
branch of government).104 Consequently, the process of decision-making is not subject to approval or control. Each prosecutor is free to begin an investigation into a corporation, with little chance of
interference by a superior.105 The citizenry’s attention to issues related to corruption in Brazil, together with the independence of the
Prosecutor’s Office, may encourage prosecutors to prosecute cases
against large companies under BACA simply because of societal pressures.106 This could lead to inefficiency and frivolous investigations,
and it could place a substantial burden on the judicial system.
The diffuse model of enforcement envisioned by BACA can lead
to several problems. There are legitimate concerns about the efficiency
of such a system, as well as the potential danger to corporations that
will be subject to potentially hundreds of different sets of regulations
and rules. Yet, perhaps most frightening is the possibility that the decentralization of enforcement under BACA could work against the
objectives of the Act itself. The lack of oversight both for administrative agencies and the Public Prosecutor’s Office might lead to further
corruption as companies could be subject to pressures and attempts at
blackmail in order to avoid sanctions from the very agencies that are
bringing suit against them.107
III.

ELIMINATING

RISKS: RECOMMENDATIONS
IMPROVED BACA

THE

AN

FOR

The success of the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Act and its power
to reduce corruption in Brazil is entirely dependent on the agencies
prosecuting and enforcing the new law.108 Brazil has been a party for
nearly two decades to three different international treaties battling
corruption. Nevertheless, lacking adequate enforcement, the conventions did not address the problems. Perhaps prompted by last summer’s protests, the Mensalâo scandal, and a growing international
discussion about corruption in the country, Brazil has taken significant steps to clean up both its corporate and political sectors. BACA
104
See Mauro Figueiredo, Ministério Público of Brazil: An Institution in Defense of
Future Generations, ELAW SPOTLIGHT (Aug. 7, 2013), http://elawspotlight.word
press.com/2013/08/07/ministerio-publico-of-brazil-an-institution-in-defense-of-fut
ure-generations/ (describing the role of the federal prosecutor in the Brazilian
government).
105
See Novos Riscos, supra note 8 (discussing the autonomy of the Public
Prosecutor).
106
Id.
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See Bezerra, supra note 87.
108
Contra Senra da Cunha Pereira, supra note 8 (“A law, in and of itself, does not
change anything. Corruption is a much more social than legal issue.”).
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can be extremely successful in curbing the perceived rampant corruption in Brazil, but only if agencies are willing and able to enforce it.
Ideally, the BACA should designate a specific government
agency or group of agencies with responsibility for filing and pursuing
both civil and administrative actions against corporate entities in violation of the Act.109 Under this model, Brazil would enjoy two primary
benefits: the designated agency or group of agencies would be able to
develop the relevant technical expertise, and the business community
would have consistent guidance, allowing corporations to implement
effective internal compliance measures.110 To aid in its success, the
legislature should consider amending the Act to delegate the enforcement of BACA to a set of specific agencies. It would seem that the CGU
would be qualified to handle all prosecutions under BACA for the administrative liability, while the Public Prosecutor’s Office could bring
charges before the judicial branch under the civil liability section of
BACA. The CGU already has exclusive responsibility over proceedings
relating to foreign government officials, and has also been given the
discretion to exercise jurisdiction over matters involving the federal
executive branch.111 Consolidating power into one or two agencies
would lead to higher levels of efficiency, more uniform interpretations
of BACA, and more consistently imposed sanctions. The CGU is
uniquely qualified to handle anti-corruption litigation. As a central
agency of the federal government, the CGU has a qualified technical
team specialized in anti-corruption matters.112 The agency has also
been involved in discussions about BACA since the early stages of its
legislative process, and therefore, it is familiar with the law’s key features.113 Given the CGU’s centralized approach and specialized expertise, one expects it to apply the law in a coherent way.114 In terms of
efficiency, as a general rule, every CGU investigation must be concluded within a 180-day period.115 This would ensure that investigations and legal proceedings do not drag on, perhaps destroying the
reputation and image of innocent corporations. Furthermore, affected
agencies can coordinate with a single official at CGU, bringing all complaints in a single transaction rather than conducting multiple investigations and trying to contact each affected agency for information.
In lieu of this legislative change, there are several alternative
solutions. First, Jorge Hage and the CGU, in their forthcoming draft
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Accord dos Santos Barradas Correia, supra note 40.
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See Decreto No. 12,846 art. 8 § 2º, art. 9, & art. 16 § 10º.
Ayres, supra note 54.
Id.
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Dos Santos Barradas Correia, supra note 40.
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legislation, must set strict parameters to account for the lack of technical and legal criteria to render decisions under BACA. The Brazilian
government should also incentivize reporting violations and provide
protection to whistleblowers in order to encourage agency employees to
report misconduct.116
Alternatively, Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of BACA provides for
the delegation of powers, which could open the possibility that,
through agreements, there could be some concentration of enforcement
in a smaller number of agencies.117 This would hopefully allow those
delegated agencies the opportunity to develop expertise in the complex
field of corruption investigations and litigation and allow for more uniform decisions and impartial treatment of defendant-corporations.118
Finally, the legislature could create or denote an appellate
body with the power to review all decisions from administrative agencies. This would provide the requisite oversight in order to reduce the
risk of illegal “adjustments.”119
CONCLUSION
The Brazilian government has taken significant strides to combat corporate corruption. No matter their motives, BACA is a vital and
sweeping piece of legislation that fights corruption by Brazilian and
foreign entities. The penalties are stiff, and corporations doing business in Brazil have been quick to establish compliance divisions and
began creating and implementing policies to avoid administrative and
civil liability under BACA. Nevertheless, there is one particularly important shortcoming within the Act. A decentralized model of enforcement will lead to an inconsistent application of law, pose challenges to
effective and cooperative enforcement between regulatory agencies,
and potentially create conflict of interests. Sadly, this Act even has the
potential to prompt further corruption due to lack of oversight. The Act
is not beyond redemption, however. The Brazilian legislature could
116

Zaheer, supra note 68, at 47 (citing Transparency International, Exporting
Corruption Progress Report 2013: Assessing Enforcement of the OECD Convention
on Combating Foreign Bribery 6, 23 (2013), available at http://www.transparency
.org/whatwedo/pub/exporting_corruption_progress_report_2013_assessing_enfor
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117
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administrative processes and the judgment of the legal entity for determining liability may be delegated.”).
118
MIGALHAS, supra note 88.
119
Bezerra, supra note 87 (quoting attorney Jair Jaloreto) (“Whenever there is an
excessive concentration of power of decision on punishing or not punishing or on
deciding whether an accused is guilty or innocent, we are faced with characteristics of the subtleties of human nature. Deviations of character and conduct are
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delegate enforcement powers to one or two regulatory agencies and/or
create an appealable body that can review the decisions of all administrative bodies.

